x 0

This is my key lessons learned(cannot apply the Dollar Cost Averaging)

" Lack of Double Bottoms" (no support)

Execution algo feeding relentless supply

If price keeps slicing through levels without bounce, there' s no floor. Exit.

ons

sfw2124 ( Date: 07-Jan-2026 21:19) Posted:

I asked Perplexity AI to do a post mortem of trading basically DCA and its counter measures against HFT or Algos Trading :

Three Dangerous HFT Phases (09:00&ndash 12:00 SGT Morning Session)

Phase	Time	HFT Activity	Your Action
Price Discovery	09:00&ndash 09:30	Liquidity testing order cancellations at 90-95%	STAY OUT. Information asymmetry is maximum.
Trend Confirmation	09:30&ndash 10:30	VWAP/TWAP execution algorithms activate	OBSERVE. Apply 3-question filter before trading.
Mid-Morning Grind	10:30&ndash 12:00	Low-intensity algos stop-loss hunting increases	AVOID. Volume 30-40% below opening.

Six Observable HFT Signatures (No Charts Required)

1. Open-Drive Failure

Stock opens S$4.56, rallies to S$4.57, immediately slams back to S$4.55
Meaning: Aggressive sellers testing price. Move is rejected.
Action: Don' t buy yet. Wait 15 minutes for price to stabilize.

2. Wide Bid-Ask Spreads

Normal: S$4.55/S$4.56 (1-cent). Suddenly: S$4.55/S$4.58 (3-cent)
Meaning: Market makers are unsure of fair value HFT algos are protecting.
Action: Use limit orders only. Avoid market orders (slippage trap).

3. Layering & Hunting

Large bid orders appear at support, then vanish. Price drops sharply.
Meaning: Algos triggered retail stop-losses with spoofed depth.
Action: Place stops 0.3&ndash 0.5 cents below obvious support levels.

4. The Momentum Trap

Price rallies 2-3% in 10 minutes, volume dries up, price reverses immediately
Meaning: Algo momentum move exhausted. Retail traders trapped.
Action: Wait 2 minutes post-move for volume to stabilize before following.

5. The Spread Widening Trap

Spread widens 100%+ for 30 seconds, snaps back to normal
Meaning: HFT algos detected large order flow and protected themselves.
Action: This is " alert" signal. Don' t execute during the spike.

6. Rejection Candle Rule

Stock tries to break a level (+0.5% in < 5 min) but reverses immediately
Meaning: Algos tested that level, found no liquidity
Action: Don' t chase the failed breakout. Wait 10 minutes.

The Universal Three-Question Filter (For Any Trade)

Before initiating ANY trade during 09:00&ndash 12:00, answer these three questions:

Q1: Has the stock held above its opening price (or recent low) for 15+ minutes?

YES &rarr Price has technical credibility
NO &rarr Still in discovery mode wait

Q2: Has 15+ minutes passed since the last directional move (> 0.5%)?

YES &rarr Move has momentum likely genuine
NO &rarr You' re watching algo execution let it finish

Q3: Is the broader market (STI Index, DBS, UOB) moving in the same direction?

YES &rarr Move is systemic higher conviction
NO &rarr Move is idiosyncratic high binary risk avoid

Decision: Answer YES to all three = Trade. Answer NO to any = Wait or stay in cash.

The Afternoon Advantage Strategy

Your PDF counter-measures were morning-focused. But the real edge for small investors is in the afternoon (14:00&ndash 16:00 SGT):

Morning execution algorithms have completed
Spreads normalize (return to 1-cent normal)
Information asymmetry decreases
Institutional traders are re-engaged

Afternoon Protocol for Singtel:

Check if stock bounced 0.5&ndash 1.5% from morning low
Verify STI Index is stable/positive
Confirm bid-ask spread is normal (0.01)
Place limit buy 0.01&ndash 0.02 below current bid
Stop-loss: 0.03 below entry
Target: 0.5&ndash 1% gains exit by 15:30

Critical Rules Translated from Your PDF

PDF Concept	HFT Reality	Actionable Rule
" EMA Rejection" (algos defending trend)	Momentum algorithm fading rallies	If price touches average and bounces immediately, downtrend is locked. Don' t buy.
" Lack of Double Bottoms" (no support)	Execution algo feeding relentless supply	If price keeps slicing through levels without bounce, there' s no floor. Exit.
" Aroon Flatline at 100" (sellers dominant)	Statistical guarantee of seller pressure	Even if price is boring, sellers are in control. Stay out.
" Index Divergence" (generals retreating)	Systemic selling at work	If STI is also down, Singtel can' t swim upstream. Don' t fight the market.

Key Insight: When HFT Is Weakest

HFT algorithms have natural vulnerabilities small investors can exploit:

News/Earnings: HFT pauses during uncertainty. You have 5&ndash 10 seconds of relative symmetry.
Lunch Hours (12:00&ndash 14:00): Algos reduce activity. Fewer fake signals.
Afternoon Sessions (14:00&ndash 16:00): Execution algos have completed. Less interference.
Pre/Post Market (08:00&ndash 09:00, 16:30&ndash 17:30): HFT dormant. Safer but wide spreads.

Bottom Line: The Reframed Approach

✅ You Don' t Need Technical Charts to apply your counter-measures
✅ You Do Need Market Awareness: Understand which HFT phase you' re in
✅ You Can Observe HFT Behavior through spreads, volume, price action, and time-of-day
✅ Your Real Edge Is Avoiding, Not Fighting: Stay out during high HFT activity (09:00&ndash 12:00) trade during low activity (14:00&ndash 16:00)

Full framework document saved above: " HFT-Countermeasures-Framework.md" with comprehensive implementation rules, decision matrices, and practical afternoon trading strategies for Singtel specifically.

sfw2124 ( Date: 07-Jan-2026 21:06) Posted:

Singtel Share Price Decline: A Multi-Layered Analysis

1. The Optus Article as a Contributing Factor

The blog article " The Optus Quagmire: Why Singtel' s Australian Headache Just Got Worse" reflects legitimate but largely priced-in concerns rather than serving as a new catalyst for this week' s share decline. Here' s the distinction:

The article synthesizes information from the independent Schott Review, which revealed critical organizational failures at Optus: a culture of fear that prevented information escalation during the emergency call outage, inappropriate staff terminations perceived as scapegoating, and a technical failure (the " camping on" defect) that delayed emergency calls by 40-60 seconds. These issues are severe, but they emerged from events in September 2025&mdash when Singtel' s share price already fell over 2%.

What' s crucial: Singtel dropped from around S$4.73 in November 2025 to S$4.55 by December 2025&mdash a slower 3.8% decline than September' s immediate shock. The article published January 7, 2026, reflects market sentiment that has already largely incorporated Optus risk. The modest recent decline (S$4.55 to S$4.54 as of January 6) suggests the market' s acute anxiety around Optus has plateaued it' s now awaiting regulatory decisions rather than discovering new problems.

The real damage to Singtel' s valuation occurred in September. This article is capturing the slow-burn financial impact: potential future regulatory penalties, dividend sustainability questions, and management distraction. These are significant headwinds, but not a sudden shock.

2. HFT and Algorithmic Trading' s Role-responsible fot today' s " abnormal" decline- my opinion

High-frequency trading and algorithmic strategies have amplified sector rotation but are not the primary driver of Singtel' s specific decline. The evidence points to a mechanical sector reallocation rather than a targeted attack on telecom stocks.

What HFT is doing: The global algorithmic trading market has expanded dramatically&mdash projected to grow from USD $57.65 billion in 2025 to USD $150.36 billion by 2033 at a 12.73% CAGR. These algorithms operate at microsecond speeds, competing on latency advantages measured in picoseconds. As of January 2026, HFT algorithms have detected a clear pattern: sector rotation away from software and growth tech toward semiconductors and cyclical stocks

x 0

I asked Perplexity AI to do a post mortem of trading basically DCA and its counter measures against HFT or Algos Trading :

Three Dangerous HFT Phases (09:00&ndash 12:00 SGT Morning Session)

Phase	Time	HFT Activity	Your Action
Price Discovery	09:00&ndash 09:30	Liquidity testing order cancellations at 90-95%	STAY OUT. Information asymmetry is maximum.
Trend Confirmation	09:30&ndash 10:30	VWAP/TWAP execution algorithms activate	OBSERVE. Apply 3-question filter before trading.
Mid-Morning Grind	10:30&ndash 12:00	Low-intensity algos stop-loss hunting increases	AVOID. Volume 30-40% below opening.

Six Observable HFT Signatures (No Charts Required)

1. Open-Drive Failure

Stock opens S$4.56, rallies to S$4.57, immediately slams back to S$4.55
Meaning: Aggressive sellers testing price. Move is rejected.
Action: Don' t buy yet. Wait 15 minutes for price to stabilize.

2. Wide Bid-Ask Spreads

Normal: S$4.55/S$4.56 (1-cent). Suddenly: S$4.55/S$4.58 (3-cent)
Meaning: Market makers are unsure of fair value HFT algos are protecting.
Action: Use limit orders only. Avoid market orders (slippage trap).

3. Layering & Hunting

Large bid orders appear at support, then vanish. Price drops sharply.
Meaning: Algos triggered retail stop-losses with spoofed depth.
Action: Place stops 0.3&ndash 0.5 cents below obvious support levels.

4. The Momentum Trap

Price rallies 2-3% in 10 minutes, volume dries up, price reverses immediately
Meaning: Algo momentum move exhausted. Retail traders trapped.
Action: Wait 2 minutes post-move for volume to stabilize before following.

5. The Spread Widening Trap

Spread widens 100%+ for 30 seconds, snaps back to normal
Meaning: HFT algos detected large order flow and protected themselves.
Action: This is " alert" signal. Don' t execute during the spike.

6. Rejection Candle Rule

Stock tries to break a level (+0.5% in < 5 min) but reverses immediately
Meaning: Algos tested that level, found no liquidity
Action: Don' t chase the failed breakout. Wait 10 minutes.

The Universal Three-Question Filter (For Any Trade)

Before initiating ANY trade during 09:00&ndash 12:00, answer these three questions:

Q1: Has the stock held above its opening price (or recent low) for 15+ minutes?

YES &rarr Price has technical credibility
NO &rarr Still in discovery mode wait

Q2: Has 15+ minutes passed since the last directional move (> 0.5%)?

YES &rarr Move has momentum likely genuine
NO &rarr You' re watching algo execution let it finish

Q3: Is the broader market (STI Index, DBS, UOB) moving in the same direction?

YES &rarr Move is systemic higher conviction
NO &rarr Move is idiosyncratic high binary risk avoid

Decision: Answer YES to all three = Trade. Answer NO to any = Wait or stay in cash.

The Afternoon Advantage Strategy

Your PDF counter-measures were morning-focused. But the real edge for small investors is in the afternoon (14:00&ndash 16:00 SGT):

Morning execution algorithms have completed
Spreads normalize (return to 1-cent normal)
Information asymmetry decreases
Institutional traders are re-engaged

Afternoon Protocol for Singtel:

Check if stock bounced 0.5&ndash 1.5% from morning low
Verify STI Index is stable/positive
Confirm bid-ask spread is normal (0.01)
Place limit buy 0.01&ndash 0.02 below current bid
Stop-loss: 0.03 below entry
Target: 0.5&ndash 1% gains exit by 15:30

Critical Rules Translated from Your PDF

PDF Concept	HFT Reality	Actionable Rule
" EMA Rejection" (algos defending trend)	Momentum algorithm fading rallies	If price touches average and bounces immediately, downtrend is locked. Don' t buy.
" Lack of Double Bottoms" (no support)	Execution algo feeding relentless supply	If price keeps slicing through levels without bounce, there' s no floor. Exit.
" Aroon Flatline at 100" (sellers dominant)	Statistical guarantee of seller pressure	Even if price is boring, sellers are in control. Stay out.
" Index Divergence" (generals retreating)	Systemic selling at work	If STI is also down, Singtel can' t swim upstream. Don' t fight the market.

Key Insight: When HFT Is Weakest

HFT algorithms have natural vulnerabilities small investors can exploit:

News/Earnings: HFT pauses during uncertainty. You have 5&ndash 10 seconds of relative symmetry.
Lunch Hours (12:00&ndash 14:00): Algos reduce activity. Fewer fake signals.
Afternoon Sessions (14:00&ndash 16:00): Execution algos have completed. Less interference.
Pre/Post Market (08:00&ndash 09:00, 16:30&ndash 17:30): HFT dormant. Safer but wide spreads.

Bottom Line: The Reframed Approach

✅ You Don' t Need Technical Charts to apply your counter-measures
✅ You Do Need Market Awareness: Understand which HFT phase you' re in
✅ You Can Observe HFT Behavior through spreads, volume, price action, and time-of-day
✅ Your Real Edge Is Avoiding, Not Fighting: Stay out during high HFT activity (09:00&ndash 12:00) trade during low activity (14:00&ndash 16:00)

Full framework document saved above: " HFT-Countermeasures-Framework.md" with comprehensive implementation rules, decision matrices, and practical afternoon trading strategies for Singtel specifically.

sfw2124 ( Date: 07-Jan-2026 21:06) Posted:

Singtel Share Price Decline: A Multi-Layered Analysis

1. The Optus Article as a Contributing Factor

The blog article " The Optus Quagmire: Why Singtel' s Australian Headache Just Got Worse" reflects legitimate but largely priced-in concerns rather than serving as a new catalyst for this week' s share decline. Here' s the distinction:

The article synthesizes information from the independent Schott Review, which revealed critical organizational failures at Optus: a culture of fear that prevented information escalation during the emergency call outage, inappropriate staff terminations perceived as scapegoating, and a technical failure (the " camping on" defect) that delayed emergency calls by 40-60 seconds. These issues are severe, but they emerged from events in September 2025&mdash when Singtel' s share price already fell over 2%.

What' s crucial: Singtel dropped from around S$4.73 in November 2025 to S$4.55 by December 2025&mdash a slower 3.8% decline than September' s immediate shock. The article published January 7, 2026, reflects market sentiment that has already largely incorporated Optus risk. The modest recent decline (S$4.55 to S$4.54 as of January 6) suggests the market' s acute anxiety around Optus has plateaued it' s now awaiting regulatory decisions rather than discovering new problems.

The real damage to Singtel' s valuation occurred in September. This article is capturing the slow-burn financial impact: potential future regulatory penalties, dividend sustainability questions, and management distraction. These are significant headwinds, but not a sudden shock.

2. HFT and Algorithmic Trading' s Role-responsible fot today' s " abnormal" decline- my opinion

High-frequency trading and algorithmic strategies have amplified sector rotation but are not the primary driver of Singtel' s specific decline. The evidence points to a mechanical sector reallocation rather than a targeted attack on telecom stocks.

What HFT is doing: The global algorithmic trading market has expanded dramatically&mdash projected to grow from USD $57.65 billion in 2025 to USD $150.36 billion by 2033 at a 12.73% CAGR. These algorithms operate at microsecond speeds, competing on latency advantages measured in picoseconds. As of January 2026, HFT algorithms have detected a clear pattern: sector rotation away from software and growth tech toward semiconductors and cyclical stocks

hw_1999 ( Date: 07-Jan-2026 16:59) Posted:

https://myjourneysingaporean.blogspot.com/2026/01/the-optus-quagmire-why-singtels.html

x 0

Singtel Share Price Decline: A Multi-Layered Analysis

1. The Optus Article as a Contributing Factor

The blog article " The Optus Quagmire: Why Singtel' s Australian Headache Just Got Worse" reflects legitimate but largely priced-in concerns rather than serving as a new catalyst for this week' s share decline. Here' s the distinction:

The article synthesizes information from the independent Schott Review, which revealed critical organizational failures at Optus: a culture of fear that prevented information escalation during the emergency call outage, inappropriate staff terminations perceived as scapegoating, and a technical failure (the " camping on" defect) that delayed emergency calls by 40-60 seconds. These issues are severe, but they emerged from events in September 2025&mdash when Singtel' s share price already fell over 2%.

What' s crucial: Singtel dropped from around S$4.73 in November 2025 to S$4.55 by December 2025&mdash a slower 3.8% decline than September' s immediate shock. The article published January 7, 2026, reflects market sentiment that has already largely incorporated Optus risk. The modest recent decline (S$4.55 to S$4.54 as of January 6) suggests the market' s acute anxiety around Optus has plateaued it' s now awaiting regulatory decisions rather than discovering new problems.

The real damage to Singtel' s valuation occurred in September. This article is capturing the slow-burn financial impact: potential future regulatory penalties, dividend sustainability questions, and management distraction. These are significant headwinds, but not a sudden shock.

2. HFT and Algorithmic Trading' s Role-responsible fot today' s " abnormal" decline- my opinion

High-frequency trading and algorithmic strategies have amplified sector rotation but are not the primary driver of Singtel' s specific decline. The evidence points to a mechanical sector reallocation rather than a targeted attack on telecom stocks.

What HFT is doing: The global algorithmic trading market has expanded dramatically&mdash projected to grow from USD $57.65 billion in 2025 to USD $150.36 billion by 2033 at a 12.73% CAGR. These algorithms operate at microsecond speeds, competing on latency advantages measured in picoseconds. As of January 2026, HFT algorithms have detected a clear pattern: sector rotation away from software and growth tech toward semiconductors and cyclical stocks

hw_1999 ( Date: 07-Jan-2026 16:59) Posted:

https://myjourneysingaporean.blogspot.com/2026/01/the-optus-quagmire-why-singtels.html

x 0

Regional Market Opportunity (Inferred)

Southeast Queensland Demographic Tailwinds:

Cryna sits in Scenic Rim Region, 120-140 km southwest of Brisbane. This area experiences compelling dynamics:

Regional migration acceleration: ~20% more city-dwellers relocating to regional Queensland post-pandemic versus pre-pandemic baseline
Affordability arbitrage: Scenic Rim median house prices under A$600,000, compared to south-east Queensland mostly over A$600,000
Land scarcity: 3,000sqm+ large-lot supply is " incredibly rare," creating supply-demand imbalance favorable for subdivision
Proximity benefits: 35-60 minute drive to Brisbane, balancing rural lifestyle with urban access

sfw2124 ( Date: 06-Jan-2026 21:44) Posted:

Wee Hur (E3B) 2026 Catalyst Refresh: Comprehensive Roadmap

The analysis identified 6-8 major catalysts for 2026, and based on current market conditions as of January 6, 2026, the full catalyst calendar remains intact. At S$0.76, the stock sits in an optimal entry zone ahead of accelerating catalysts, with a probability-weighted target of S$0.95-1.05 by August 2026 and S$1.05-1.25 by year-end. Here is your complete updated roadmap:

Q1 2026: Foundation Building Phase

Havelock Road Hotel Renovation Launch (Jan-Feb 2026)

Wee Hur' s S$160M acquisition of Hotel Miramar on Havelock Road enters active renovation phase under the DoubleTree brand. The 344-room asset is targeted for soft opening in Q3 2026 and grand reopening in Q4 2026 or Q1 2027. This represents a critical value-creation milestone&mdash management guidance projects stabilized annual EBITDA of S$12-15M on the S$190M all-in investment (7-8% cap rate), translating to S$0.01-0.02 in annual earnings per share once operational. Near-term impact is modest (2-3% upside for mid-year progress updates), but the asset becomes a meaningful earnings driver in FY2027 and beyond. The Conrad Hotels management framework and Hilton brand strength mitigate renovation execution risk.

Upper Thomson Road Land Acquisition Close (Q1 2026)

The S$613.9M Upper Thomson Road acquisition, secured in partnership with GSC Holdings (50% shareholding) at S$1,062 per square foot plot ratio, formally closes. This 2.44-hectare, 595-unit mixed-use residential development in Singapore' s District 26 represents Wee Hur' s largest domestic project pipeline. The adjacent Springleaf Residence achieved 99% sell-through at premium prices, validating market demand for the precinct. Formal land acquisition completion confirms capital deployment capability and removes execution risk, though provides only 2-3% tactical upside.

Q2 2026: Approvals Cascade

FY2025 Results Announcement (Late February 2026)

This is the highest-impact catalyst of the first half. Expected announcement on February 26-27, 2026:

Metric FY2024A FY2025E Growth Impact

Revenue S$200.8M S$293M +46% 5-10% upside on beat

Net Profit S$57M S$180M +215% 10-15% upside if exceeded

EPS 6.2 cents 19.6 cents +216% 8-12% upside on confirmation

Dividend 0.5 cents H1 0.7-0.8 cents +40-60% 3-5% yield support

The profit forecast hinges on three revenue drivers: (1) Bartley Vue Final Phase Revenue (100% pre-sold, completion confirms the S$180M profit trajectory), (2) Fund Management Fees Annualization (H1 2025 showed S$40.3M revenue, a 1,657% year-over-year jump&mdash full-year run-rate validates the recurring revenue model), and (3) PBSA Fund I Divestment Gains (final tranche of S$36.5M realized in April 2025, with net cash position confirmation). Post-results target: S$0.82-0.88 (6-13% upside, 70% probability).

Cryna Project DA Approval (Q2-Q3 2026)

Wee Hur' s 2,000+ residential lot Cryna development in Queensland targets Development Approval in the first half of 2026. This is the company' s largest Australian property pipeline and represents S$400-500M in embedded project value. DA approval alone should unlock 5-10% upside through headline validation of Wee Hur' s Australian development capability. Per-share embedded profit is estimated at S$0.09-0.12 from Cryna economics. High probability 65%.

Upper Thomson Road DA Submission & Approval (Q2-Q3 2026)

Upper Thomson DA submission formally begins the planning process in Q2, with approval targeted for Q3 2026. This is the green light for construction and represents the single largest value catalyst in the 2026 calendar. The project carries embedded profit potential of S$200M (20-30% markup on the S$614M land cost over the 6-year development cycle). Conservative profit estimates range from S$123-184M, translating to S$0.08-0.10 per share accretion in NAV. Post-DA approval target: S$0.88-0.95 (14-22% upside, 65% probability).

Lowood One Fund III Construction Commencement (Q2-Q3 2026)

Infrastructure works for Lowood One (358-unit residential development, Adelaide) commence following DA approval obtained in early 2025. This also launches the 708-bed Purpose-Built Student Accommodation (PBSA) at 188 Grenfell, Adelaide, which began construction in H1 2025 with targeted completion in early 2028. Fund III construction initiation generates: FY26 S$5-10M in construction management fees, FY27 S$15-25M full-year construction management, and FY28 S$5-8M recurring fund management fees on a 20% equity stake. Impact: 3-5% upside.

H1 2026 Results (August 2026)

H1 2026 Results Announcement (August 6, 2026)

The mid-year results provide critical EPS growth confirmation. Expected metrics:

Metric H1 2025A H1 2026E Growth

Revenue S$156M S$180-200M +15-28%

Net Profit S$38.7M S$70-85M +81-120%

EPS 0.042 cents 0.080-0.095 cents +90-126%

Interim Dividend 0.5 cents 0.6-0.7 cents +20-40%

This results announcement validates Wee Hur' s growth trajectory and supports multiple re-rating. Post-results target: S$0.92-1.05 (19-35% upside, 70% probability).

Q3-Q4 2026: Execution Visibility

Havelock Road Soft Opening & Grand Reopening (Q3-Q4 2026)

Mid-year progress updates (Q2-Q3) provide schedule and budget confirmations, with 2-3% upside. Q3 soft opening and Q4/Q1 2027 grand reopening milestones mark the operational transition of the 344-room asset. By Q4 2026, the hotel transitions from construction to revenue generation, setting up meaningful FY2027 earnings contribution. Price target by Q4 2026: S$0.95-1.05 (22-35% upside, 55% probability).

Year-End 2026: Growth Confirmation

FY2026 Guidance Refinement (Throughout 2026)

Quarterly earnings releases should progressively raise FY26 revenue guidance toward S$300M+, critical for multiple expansion and institutional re-rating

Investment Thesis Summary

2026 is the inflection year for Wee Hur. Six to eight major catalysts are scheduled sequentially throughout the year&mdash FY2025 results (Feb), development approvals for Upper Thomson and Cryna (Apr-May), H1 2026 results (Aug), and hotel reopening execution (Q4). Each quarterly milestone should deliver 5-10% tactical upside compounding through the year yields 35-60% potential annual returns.

MarcLim ( Date: 06-Jan-2026 07:47) Posted:

Wao.
v details analysis than me. Nice.
80c coming and next 84/85 then 90 and above moon...
wait for the report
DYDD Huat all 🙏 🏻

x 0

Wee Hur (E3B) 2026 Catalyst Refresh: Comprehensive Roadmap

The analysis identified 6-8 major catalysts for 2026, and based on current market conditions as of January 6, 2026, the full catalyst calendar remains intact. At S$0.76, the stock sits in an optimal entry zone ahead of accelerating catalysts, with a probability-weighted target of S$0.95-1.05 by August 2026 and S$1.05-1.25 by year-end. Here is your complete updated roadmap:

Q1 2026: Foundation Building Phase

Havelock Road Hotel Renovation Launch (Jan-Feb 2026)

Wee Hur' s S$160M acquisition of Hotel Miramar on Havelock Road enters active renovation phase under the DoubleTree brand. The 344-room asset is targeted for soft opening in Q3 2026 and grand reopening in Q4 2026 or Q1 2027. This represents a critical value-creation milestone&mdash management guidance projects stabilized annual EBITDA of S$12-15M on the S$190M all-in investment (7-8% cap rate), translating to S$0.01-0.02 in annual earnings per share once operational. Near-term impact is modest (2-3% upside for mid-year progress updates), but the asset becomes a meaningful earnings driver in FY2027 and beyond. The Conrad Hotels management framework and Hilton brand strength mitigate renovation execution risk.

Upper Thomson Road Land Acquisition Close (Q1 2026)

The S$613.9M Upper Thomson Road acquisition, secured in partnership with GSC Holdings (50% shareholding) at S$1,062 per square foot plot ratio, formally closes. This 2.44-hectare, 595-unit mixed-use residential development in Singapore' s District 26 represents Wee Hur' s largest domestic project pipeline. The adjacent Springleaf Residence achieved 99% sell-through at premium prices, validating market demand for the precinct. Formal land acquisition completion confirms capital deployment capability and removes execution risk, though provides only 2-3% tactical upside.

Q2 2026: Approvals Cascade

FY2025 Results Announcement (Late February 2026)

This is the highest-impact catalyst of the first half. Expected announcement on February 26-27, 2026:

Metric FY2024A FY2025E Growth Impact

Revenue S$200.8M S$293M +46% 5-10% upside on beat

Net Profit S$57M S$180M +215% 10-15% upside if exceeded

EPS 6.2 cents 19.6 cents +216% 8-12% upside on confirmation

Dividend 0.5 cents H1 0.7-0.8 cents +40-60% 3-5% yield support

The profit forecast hinges on three revenue drivers: (1) Bartley Vue Final Phase Revenue (100% pre-sold, completion confirms the S$180M profit trajectory), (2) Fund Management Fees Annualization (H1 2025 showed S$40.3M revenue, a 1,657% year-over-year jump&mdash full-year run-rate validates the recurring revenue model), and (3) PBSA Fund I Divestment Gains (final tranche of S$36.5M realized in April 2025, with net cash position confirmation). Post-results target: S$0.82-0.88 (6-13% upside, 70% probability).

Cryna Project DA Approval (Q2-Q3 2026)

Wee Hur' s 2,000+ residential lot Cryna development in Queensland targets Development Approval in the first half of 2026. This is the company' s largest Australian property pipeline and represents S$400-500M in embedded project value. DA approval alone should unlock 5-10% upside through headline validation of Wee Hur' s Australian development capability. Per-share embedded profit is estimated at S$0.09-0.12 from Cryna economics. High probability 65%.

Upper Thomson Road DA Submission & Approval (Q2-Q3 2026)

Upper Thomson DA submission formally begins the planning process in Q2, with approval targeted for Q3 2026. This is the green light for construction and represents the single largest value catalyst in the 2026 calendar. The project carries embedded profit potential of S$200M (20-30% markup on the S$614M land cost over the 6-year development cycle). Conservative profit estimates range from S$123-184M, translating to S$0.08-0.10 per share accretion in NAV. Post-DA approval target: S$0.88-0.95 (14-22% upside, 65% probability).

Lowood One Fund III Construction Commencement (Q2-Q3 2026)

Infrastructure works for Lowood One (358-unit residential development, Adelaide) commence following DA approval obtained in early 2025. This also launches the 708-bed Purpose-Built Student Accommodation (PBSA) at 188 Grenfell, Adelaide, which began construction in H1 2025 with targeted completion in early 2028. Fund III construction initiation generates: FY26 S$5-10M in construction management fees, FY27 S$15-25M full-year construction management, and FY28 S$5-8M recurring fund management fees on a 20% equity stake. Impact: 3-5% upside.

H1 2026 Results (August 2026)

H1 2026 Results Announcement (August 6, 2026)

The mid-year results provide critical EPS growth confirmation. Expected metrics:

Metric H1 2025A H1 2026E Growth

Revenue S$156M S$180-200M +15-28%

Net Profit S$38.7M S$70-85M +81-120%

EPS 0.042 cents 0.080-0.095 cents +90-126%

Interim Dividend 0.5 cents 0.6-0.7 cents +20-40%

This results announcement validates Wee Hur' s growth trajectory and supports multiple re-rating. Post-results target: S$0.92-1.05 (19-35% upside, 70% probability).

Q3-Q4 2026: Execution Visibility

Havelock Road Soft Opening & Grand Reopening (Q3-Q4 2026)

Mid-year progress updates (Q2-Q3) provide schedule and budget confirmations, with 2-3% upside. Q3 soft opening and Q4/Q1 2027 grand reopening milestones mark the operational transition of the 344-room asset. By Q4 2026, the hotel transitions from construction to revenue generation, setting up meaningful FY2027 earnings contribution. Price target by Q4 2026: S$0.95-1.05 (22-35% upside, 55% probability).

Year-End 2026: Growth Confirmation

FY2026 Guidance Refinement (Throughout 2026)

Quarterly earnings releases should progressively raise FY26 revenue guidance toward S$300M+, critical for multiple expansion and institutional re-rating

Investment Thesis Summary

2026 is the inflection year for Wee Hur. Six to eight major catalysts are scheduled sequentially throughout the year&mdash FY2025 results (Feb), development approvals for Upper Thomson and Cryna (Apr-May), H1 2026 results (Aug), and hotel reopening execution (Q4). Each quarterly milestone should deliver 5-10% tactical upside compounding through the year yields 35-60% potential annual returns.

MarcLim ( Date: 06-Jan-2026 07:47) Posted:

Wao.
v details analysis than me. Nice.
80c coming and next 84/85 then 90 and above moon...
wait for the report
DYDD Huat all 🙏 🏻

sfw2124 ( Date: 05-Jan-2026 21:49) Posted:

The Business Times article captures Wee Hur' s strategic inflection from construction dependency into diversified platform play. The Havelock Road hotel acquisition (November 2025) exemplifies this evolution&mdash rather than relying purely on HDB BTO contracts, Wee Hur now owns operated real estate assets (hotels, student housing, workers' dormitories) generating recurring cash flows. Wee Hur is transitioning from " cyclical construction company" into a " resilient multi-platform real estate developer + fund manager" with:

✅ Earnings Stability: S$629M orderbook locks in 5.7 years of profitable construction revenue
✅ Growth Visibility: Fund III + Upper Thomson Road development provides 12+ months of project catalysts
✅ Recurring Revenue: Fund management (1,657% revenue growth 1H25) creates high-margin, asset-light recurring income
✅ Capital Efficiency: PBSA divestment generates S$300M liquidity for higher-return deployments (hotels, development)
✅ Diversification: Multiple business vectors (construction, development, funds, hospitality, workers' accommodation) reduce single-sector concentration risk

Valuation Compression Justified by:
> Current 3.8x FY2025E P/E vs. peers at 8-15x
> 0.35x Price-to-Book vs. peers at 1.0-1.5x
> 1.6x EV/EBITDA vs. peers at 8-12x

Opportunity: 50% multiple expansion (+S$0.37/share) if analyst consensus P/E moves to 6-7x as growth visibility improve

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The Business Times article captures Wee Hur' s strategic inflection from construction dependency into diversified platform play. The Havelock Road hotel acquisition (November 2025) exemplifies this evolution&mdash rather than relying purely on HDB BTO contracts, Wee Hur now owns operated real estate assets (hotels, student housing, workers' dormitories) generating recurring cash flows. Wee Hur is transitioning from " cyclical construction company" into a " resilient multi-platform real estate developer + fund manager" with:

✅ Earnings Stability: S$629M orderbook locks in 5.7 years of profitable construction revenue
✅ Growth Visibility: Fund III + Upper Thomson Road development provides 12+ months of project catalysts
✅ Recurring Revenue: Fund management (1,657% revenue growth 1H25) creates high-margin, asset-light recurring income
✅ Capital Efficiency: PBSA divestment generates S$300M liquidity for higher-return deployments (hotels, development)
✅ Diversification: Multiple business vectors (construction, development, funds, hospitality, workers' accommodation) reduce single-sector concentration risk

Valuation Compression Justified by:
> Current 3.8x FY2025E P/E vs. peers at 8-15x
> 0.35x Price-to-Book vs. peers at 1.0-1.5x
> 1.6x EV/EBITDA vs. peers at 8-12x

Opportunity: 50% multiple expansion (+S$0.37/share) if analyst consensus P/E moves to 6-7x as growth visibility improves

Nippon72 ( Date: 01-Dec-2025 11:29) Posted:

I have faith the $5bil by G was meant to be a yeast or catalyst to brand SGX as a financial heart or hub whatever we called it of Asean/Asia. Peasant investor like me just ride on the coattail or go with the flow.
So if this happens, the spin-off to other areas which may benefit larger community instead.

Caesar ( Date: 01-Dec-2025 11:08) Posted:

In the first place, I don't think our gov should even spend so much money to support the market. Only those who have extra $oney would invest/play the market. These people don't need gov support. Our gov should spend the $5b in areas where help is truly needed e.g. subsidized health care, more support for low income families, the elderlies and their caregivers, etc ...

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Comments by Perplexity AI on the link to Simply Wall ST' sArticle

Assessment of Simply Wall St Article on Yangzijiang Shipbuilding

Verdict: PARTIALLY CONCUR &ndash with important caveats on earnings growth and valuation comparisons

What the Article Gets Right

Valuation discount is real. The P/E of 9.55x is genuinely below many comparables. However, the peer average cited (15.14x) may reflect a selective machinery universe. Simply Wall St' s broader Asian machinery sector trades at 24.9x, making BS6' s discount even more compelling on that metric.

Balance sheet strength is confirmed. Net cash position of RMB18.3 billion (1H25), debt-to-equity of 21.7%, and interest coverage well above stress levels validate financial stability. Free cash flow of RMB11.9 billion in FY2024 supports the cash generation narrative.

Low volatility claim is accurate. Beta ranges from 0.62-0.82, confirming below-market price stability, though this also means slower multiple re-rating as Simply Wall St notes.

Strong order visibility exists. USD24.4 billion order book spanning through 2030 with 74% eco-friendly vessels provides genuine multi-year revenue visibility.

Where the Article Overstates

Earnings growth projection is too aggressive. The claim of " 30% earnings growth over the next few years" misrepresents analyst consensus:

DBS Group: 24% growth in FY25, only 10% in FY26
CGS/Bloomberg consensus: 5.36% (2025) and 11.61% (2026)
Blended two-year growth ~15-20%, well below the stated 30%

The strong 1H25 results (+37% y-o-y profit) are real but rest on temporarily favorable steel costs and foreign exchange. Management has already flagged margin moderation in 2H25 due to lower-margin oil tanker deliveries.

The Material Warning Sign Overlooked

The article mentions " 1 warning sign" without elaboration. The primary concern is earnings quality. A June 2025 analysis identified an accrual ratio of 0.26 for the 12-month period, meaning free cash flow (RMB5.7B) significantly lagged reported profit (RMB7.76B).

However, this context matters: FY2024 showed an accrual ratio of -0.70, indicating superior cash conversion. The recent deterioration may reflect the timing of receivables and working capital rather than a fundamental issue, but it warrants monitoring.

The Real Risk Not Addressed

The article ignores the elephant in the room: US trade threats. Global shipbuilding orders collapsed 54% year-on-year in 1H25 primarily due to tariff concerns. Proposed US port fees of up to USD1 million per Chinese-built vessel threaten demand by increasing end-user costs substantially. This represents downside risk to the order book beyond current visibility.

Bottom Line

The valuation case is sound&mdash BS6 trades at a meaningful discount to operational quality and growth prospects. The " bargain" label is justified on traditional metrics. However, investors should expect 15-20% earnings growth, not 30%, with near-term margin headwinds in 2H25. The cash flow quality deserves closer scrutiny given recent accrual deterioration, and US tariff risks could materially impact order wins in 2025-2026 despite the strong current backlog.

P/E multiples from TipRanks and WiseSheets Simply Wall St Asian Machinery sector comparison 1H25 press release and balance sheet data FY2024 financial statements Beta (5Y) from multiple sources Company order book disclosures DBS Group forecasts CGS International/Bloomberg consensus 1H25 earnings beat drivers Yahoo Finance analysis, June 2025 FY2024 accrual analysis 1H25 global shipbuilding contraction data DYOGG

Winnertakeall ( Date: 30-Dec-2025 18:51) Posted:

Is It Time To Consider Buying Yangzijiang Shipbuilding (Holdings) Ltd. (SGX:BS6)?

Simply Wall St - Mon, December 29, 2025
https://finance.yahoo.com/news/time-consider-buying-yangzijiang-shipbuilding-042417780.html

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FY2026 GUIDANCE &ndash The Critical Promise

What UOB Management Said (in Q3 earnings call, Aug 2025):

" We expect credit costs in FY2026 to NORMALIZE to 25-30 basis points"

What This Means in Simple Terms:

We (UOB management) took a S$615m precautionary hit in Q3 2025
We believe that was sufficient / overly cautious
Going forward, credit costs will normalize back to 25-30 bps (typical/expected level)
This means the provision buffer we built will NOT be needed
Result: In FY2026, instead of releasing S$615m, we' ll reverse/release SOME of that provision
This provision RELEASE will boost FY2026 earnings

The Mathematical Certainty (Why It' s Called " Certain" ):

Component	FY2025 Actual	FY2026 Expected	Impact
Operating profit (before provisions)	S$1.9b	S$1.8-1.9b	Moderate headwind (NIM compression)
Credit costs/Provisions	134 bps (abnormal)	25-30 bps (normalized)	+100-110 bps improvement ✅
Net profit calculation	S$1.76b (9M)	S$2.0-2.2b (est FY26)	15-25% earnings growth ✅

Why This Is " Mathematically Certain" :

The S$615m was already taken (it' s done no longer an earnings headwind)
Management explicitly committed to 25-30bps normalized credit costs (public guidance)
If macro doesn' t deteriorate further, the earnings swing is AUTOMATIC and GUARANTEED
It doesn' t depend on revenue growth or business improvement&mdash just on provision normalization

sfw2124 ( Date: 27-Dec-2025 11:46) Posted:

UOB BULL CASE EXPLAINED: WHAT DOES " PROVISIONS CONFIRMED" MEAN?

Simple Explanation with Real Examples

Analysis Date: 27 December 2025
Your Question: What is the Bull Case? What does " Provisions Confirmed" mean?

PART 1: UNDERSTANDING " PROVISIONS" &ndash THE BANKING CONCEPT

What Are Provisions? (Simple Explanation)

Imagine you' re a bank lending money to borrowers:

A bank knows that NOT ALL borrowers will repay their loans. Some will default. So the bank sets aside money in advance to cover expected losses. This " set-aside money" is called a PROVISION.

Real-World Example:

A bank lends S$1 billion to customers
History shows 1% of loans default (S$10 million)
The bank sets aside S$10 million to cover expected losses
This S$10 million is a " provision"

When a bank INCREASES provisions, what happens?

The bank is saying: " We' re setting aside MORE money because we think MORE loans will default"
This money comes out of current-year earnings
Result: Lower reported profit (even though actual business may be fine)

When a bank REVERSES/RELEASES provisions, what happens?

The bank is saying: " We no longer need this extra safety buffer credit quality has improved"
This money goes BACK INTO earnings
Result: Higher reported profit (from releasing cash that was set aside)

UOB' s Specific Provision Situation (Q3 2025)

What UOB Did (July-August 2025):

UOB took a S$615 MILLION PRE-EMPTIVE GENERAL PROVISION
This was on TOP of normal, expected provisions
Why? Management was being cautious about potential credit losses (US property weakness, China slowdown)
Impact on Earnings: This provision reduced Q3 net profit by S$615m
Q3 Result: Net profit collapsed 72% (from S$1.61bn to S$443m)

What This Means:

UOB' s Q3 earnings looked TERRIBLE (72% drop)
BUT: The drop was NOT because of bad business performance
The drop was VOLUNTARY & PRE-EMPTIVE: UOB chose to over-provision for safety
Think of it like: " We' re putting extra money in the piggy bank just in case"

The Banking Math:

Normal expected credit costs: ~25-30 basis points (bps) of loan book
UOB' s Q3 actual credit costs: 134 bps (= 100-110 bps EXTRA due to pre-emptive provision)
The 100-110 bps swing is the key point: This swing is one-time, non-recurring

JurongW ( Date: 26-Dec-2025 16:11) Posted:

Thanks for the comprehensive summary.

If UOB trades conservatively to P/B 1.4x in 2026, then share price should be around $40.50 (15.5% return excluding dividend yield of 5%

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UOB BULL CASE EXPLAINED: WHAT DOES " PROVISIONS CONFIRMED" MEAN?

Simple Explanation with Real Examples

Analysis Date: 27 December 2025
Your Question: What is the Bull Case? What does " Provisions Confirmed" mean?

PART 1: UNDERSTANDING " PROVISIONS" &ndash THE BANKING CONCEPT

What Are Provisions? (Simple Explanation)

Imagine you' re a bank lending money to borrowers:

A bank knows that NOT ALL borrowers will repay their loans. Some will default. So the bank sets aside money in advance to cover expected losses. This " set-aside money" is called a PROVISION.

Real-World Example:

A bank lends S$1 billion to customers
History shows 1% of loans default (S$10 million)
The bank sets aside S$10 million to cover expected losses
This S$10 million is a " provision"

When a bank INCREASES provisions, what happens?

The bank is saying: " We' re setting aside MORE money because we think MORE loans will default"
This money comes out of current-year earnings
Result: Lower reported profit (even though actual business may be fine)

When a bank REVERSES/RELEASES provisions, what happens?

The bank is saying: " We no longer need this extra safety buffer credit quality has improved"
This money goes BACK INTO earnings
Result: Higher reported profit (from releasing cash that was set aside)

UOB' s Specific Provision Situation (Q3 2025)

What UOB Did (July-August 2025):

UOB took a S$615 MILLION PRE-EMPTIVE GENERAL PROVISION
This was on TOP of normal, expected provisions
Why? Management was being cautious about potential credit losses (US property weakness, China slowdown)
Impact on Earnings: This provision reduced Q3 net profit by S$615m
Q3 Result: Net profit collapsed 72% (from S$1.61bn to S$443m)

What This Means:

UOB' s Q3 earnings looked TERRIBLE (72% drop)
BUT: The drop was NOT because of bad business performance
The drop was VOLUNTARY & PRE-EMPTIVE: UOB chose to over-provision for safety
Think of it like: " We' re putting extra money in the piggy bank just in case"

The Banking Math:

Normal expected credit costs: ~25-30 basis points (bps) of loan book
UOB' s Q3 actual credit costs: 134 bps (= 100-110 bps EXTRA due to pre-emptive provision)
The 100-110 bps swing is the key point: This swing is one-time, non-recurring

JurongW ( Date: 26-Dec-2025 16:11) Posted:

Thanks for the comprehensive summary.

If UOB trades conservatively to P/B 1.4x in 2026, then share price should be around $40.50 (15.5% return excluding dividend yield of 5%)

sfw2124 ( Date: 26-Dec-2025 15:34) Posted:

Executive Summary: Singapore Big Three Banks 2026-2028 Tactical Analysis

Updated Pricing: December 26, 2025, 3:27 PM

Investment Recommendation: BUY UOB (U11)

Core Thesis (One Sentence)

UOB is entering a mathematically-certain earnings recovery cycle in 2026 driven by provision normalization&mdash offering 11-15% annualized returns over 2-3 years at a 40-85% valuation discount to peers, while OCBC and DBS offer only 6-10% with less visibility or higher risk.

Why UOB Wins

The Catalyst: UOB took a one-off S$615M provision in Q3 2025 (abnormal 82 bps credit costs). Management commits FY2026 credit costs will normalize to 25-30 bps&mdash a mathematical guarantee of 15-25% earnings recovery independent of revenue growth.

Current Opportunity (Dec 26, 2025):

Price: S$35.05 (excellent entry timing)
Valuation: P/B 1.21x (cheapest) P/E 10.07x
Target 2027: S$38-42 = 8-20% upside
Dividend: 5.0-5.4% annually
Total 2-3 Year Return: 8-12% annualized (3-7% capital appreciation + 5% dividend)

Why Market Missed It:

Analyst consensus target S$34.42 ignores recovery thesis
Market focus on Q3 weakness blinds them to FY2026 earnings rebound
Management buyback at S$34-35 signals internal conviction this is undervalued

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Executive Summary: Singapore Big Three Banks 2026-2028 Tactical Analysis

Updated Pricing: December 26, 2025, 3:27 PM

Investment Recommendation: BUY UOB (U11)

Core Thesis (One Sentence)

UOB is entering a mathematically-certain earnings recovery cycle in 2026 driven by provision normalization&mdash offering 11-15% annualized returns over 2-3 years at a 40-85% valuation discount to peers, while OCBC and DBS offer only 6-10% with less visibility or higher risk.

Why UOB Wins

The Catalyst: UOB took a one-off S$615M provision in Q3 2025 (abnormal 82 bps credit costs). Management commits FY2026 credit costs will normalize to 25-30 bps&mdash a mathematical guarantee of 15-25% earnings recovery independent of revenue growth.

Current Opportunity (Dec 26, 2025):

Price: S$35.05 (excellent entry timing)
Valuation: P/B 1.21x (cheapest) P/E 10.07x
Target 2027: S$38-42 = 8-20% upside
Dividend: 5.0-5.4% annually
Total 2-3 Year Return: 8-12% annualized (3-7% capital appreciation + 5% dividend)

Why Market Missed It:

Analyst consensus target S$34.42 ignores recovery thesis
Market focus on Q3 weakness blinds them to FY2026 earnings rebound
Management buyback at S$34-35 signals internal conviction this is undervalued

sfw2124 ( Date: 26-Dec-2025 15:32) Posted:

Comparative Returns Table (UPDATED PRICES)

Metric	UOB	OCBC	DBS
Current Price	S$35.05	S$19.77	S$56.11
P/B Ratio	1.21x	1.48x	2.27x
FY2026 EPS Growth	+15-25%	+3-5%	+2-4%
Price Target 2027	S$38-42	S$21-23	S$57-63
Capital Appreciation	8-20%	2-16%	2-12%
Dividend Yield	5.0-5.4%	4.89%	4.97%
Annualized Total Return	8-12%	6-10%	5-8%
Primary Catalyst	Provision normalization (confirmed)	Capital return policy (uncertain)	Dividend consistency (mature)
Valuation Risk	Low	Moderate	HIGH
Recommendation	BUY	Hold	AVOID

2026-2028 Earnings Breakdown

UOB: Recovery Play ✓ RECOMMENDED

FY2026: +15-25% earnings growth (provision normalization floor 25-30 bps)
FY2027-28: +5-8% growth (normalized + Citi integration synergies)
Dividend: 50% payout ratio maintained DPS S$0.82-0.93 FY26
Capital Support: S$2B buyback through 2027 (2-3% annual EPS accretion)
Entry: S$35.05 optimal

sfw2124 ( Date: 22-Dec-2025 22:27) Posted:

2025 DOMINATES ALL SGX COMPANIES(Share BuyBacks)

Rank	Company	2025 YTD Spending	Avg Price
1	UOB	S$560.8m	S$35.39
2	DBS	S$371.1m	S$42.77
3	OCBC	S$349.0m	S$16.67
4	Keppel	S$70.0m	S$8.39
5	Sembcorp	S$59.0m	S$6.05

UOB leads all SGX companies by 51% despite smaller market cap

WHAT THIS TELLS YOU

✓ Management Confidence: Buying aggressively at 1.2x P/B while DBS trades 2.3x
✓ Capital Strength: S$2B buyback + 6.5% dividend maintained despite Q3 provision = underlying business is STRONG
✓ EPS Accretion: ~2-3% annual EPS growth just from reduced share count
✓ Undervaluation Signal: Management sees value that market is missing
✓ Total Return Potential: 6.5% dividend + 2-3% buyback accretion + 15-21% capital gain = 24-30% over 18 months

KEY INSIGHT

2025' s 9x acceleration in buybacks (S$658.5m vs S$102m in 2024) coincides PRECISELY with:

Q3 provision announcement (Nov 6 selloff)
Asset management sale review (Dec 17)
Stock hitting S$34.00 support level

This is NOT panic buying. This is management saying: " At these prices, our shares represent exceptional value."

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Comparative Returns Table (UPDATED PRICES)

Metric	UOB	OCBC	DBS
Current Price	S$35.05	S$19.77	S$56.11
P/B Ratio	1.21x	1.48x	2.27x
FY2026 EPS Growth	+15-25%	+3-5%	+2-4%
Price Target 2027	S$38-42	S$21-23	S$57-63
Capital Appreciation	8-20%	2-16%	2-12%
Dividend Yield	5.0-5.4%	4.89%	4.97%
Annualized Total Return	8-12%	6-10%	5-8%
Primary Catalyst	Provision normalization (confirmed)	Capital return policy (uncertain)	Dividend consistency (mature)
Valuation Risk	Low	Moderate	HIGH
Recommendation	BUY	Hold	AVOID

2026-2028 Earnings Breakdown

UOB: Recovery Play ✓ RECOMMENDED

FY2026: +15-25% earnings growth (provision normalization floor 25-30 bps)
FY2027-28: +5-8% growth (normalized + Citi integration synergies)
Dividend: 50% payout ratio maintained DPS S$0.82-0.93 FY26
Capital Support: S$2B buyback through 2027 (2-3% annual EPS accretion)
Entry: S$35.05 optimal

sfw2124 ( Date: 22-Dec-2025 22:27) Posted:

2025 DOMINATES ALL SGX COMPANIES(Share BuyBacks)

Rank	Company	2025 YTD Spending	Avg Price
1	UOB	S$560.8m	S$35.39
2	DBS	S$371.1m	S$42.77
3	OCBC	S$349.0m	S$16.67
4	Keppel	S$70.0m	S$8.39
5	Sembcorp	S$59.0m	S$6.05

UOB leads all SGX companies by 51% despite smaller market cap

WHAT THIS TELLS YOU

✓ Management Confidence: Buying aggressively at 1.2x P/B while DBS trades 2.3x
✓ Capital Strength: S$2B buyback + 6.5% dividend maintained despite Q3 provision = underlying business is STRONG
✓ EPS Accretion: ~2-3% annual EPS growth just from reduced share count
✓ Undervaluation Signal: Management sees value that market is missing
✓ Total Return Potential: 6.5% dividend + 2-3% buyback accretion + 15-21% capital gain = 24-30% over 18 months

KEY INSIGHT

2025' s 9x acceleration in buybacks (S$658.5m vs S$102m in 2024) coincides PRECISELY with:

Q3 provision announcement (Nov 6 selloff)
Asset management sale review (Dec 17)
Stock hitting S$34.00 support level

This is NOT panic buying. This is management saying: " At these prices, our shares represent exceptional value."

sfw2124 ( Date: 22-Dec-2025 22:03) Posted:

UOB (U11): Why Fund Managers Got It Wrong

The selling pressure on UOB reflects two management misunderstandings:

1️ ⃣ ASSET MANAGEMENT SALE &ne DISTRESS

The $28.8B USD asset sale is portfolio optimization, not financial desperation. UOB reallocates capital from lower-return asset management to higher-growth wholesale banking and wealth management. This signals disciplined capital allocation, not weakness.

2️ ⃣ $615M PROVISION &ne ASSET QUALITY DETERIORATION

The 72% Q3 profit decline is a one-off " kitchen sink" charge to front-load anticipated losses. NPL ratio stayed stable at 1.6%. Management confirmed final 2025 dividend UNAFFECTED&mdash clear confidence signal. This is balance-sheet strengthening.

THE NUMBERS DON' T LIE

Metric	UOB	OCBC	DBS
P/B	1.2x	1.4x	2.3x
P/E	9.9x	12.1x	14.0x
Dividend	6.5%	4.8%	5.2%

UOB = Cheapest valuation + Highest yield = Pure mispricing from headlines.

WHY FUND MANAGERS BAILED

✗ Headline trading (ignored non-recurring provisions)
✗ Momentum chasing (DBS/OCBC had better Q3 earnings)
✗ Risk-off bias (preferred " safe" DBS over recovery play)
✓ Your edge: Volume spike Dec 17 = capitulation selling exhausted

2026 RECOVERY INCOMING

✓ NIM stabilizes 1.75%-1.80%
✓ Credit costs normalize to 25-30 bps (vs 134 bps Q3)
✓ Fee income growing (cards + wealth management)
✓ Earnings rebound as provisions reverse

GEOPOLITICAL WIN

UOB = most ASEAN-centric bank. Trump 2.0 tariffs = manufacturing China &rarr Vietnam/Thailand/Malaysia = FDI financing + data center boom + trade finance growth. DBS/OCBC have Greater China headwinds instead.

ACTION

Value hunters &rarr Accumulate SGD 34-36, target SGD 40-42 (15-21% gain + 6.5% yield = 22-27% return, 12-18 months)

Sources: Bloomberg (Dec 17) Investment analysis files Singapore Banks 2026 Outlook DYODD

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2025 DOMINATES ALL SGX COMPANIES(Share BuyBacks)

Rank	Company	2025 YTD Spending	Avg Price
1	UOB	S$560.8m	S$35.39
2	DBS	S$371.1m	S$42.77
3	OCBC	S$349.0m	S$16.67
4	Keppel	S$70.0m	S$8.39
5	Sembcorp	S$59.0m	S$6.05

UOB leads all SGX companies by 51% despite smaller market cap

WHAT THIS TELLS YOU

✓ Management Confidence: Buying aggressively at 1.2x P/B while DBS trades 2.3x
✓ Capital Strength: S$2B buyback + 6.5% dividend maintained despite Q3 provision = underlying business is STRONG
✓ EPS Accretion: ~2-3% annual EPS growth just from reduced share count
✓ Undervaluation Signal: Management sees value that market is missing
✓ Total Return Potential: 6.5% dividend + 2-3% buyback accretion + 15-21% capital gain = 24-30% over 18 months

KEY INSIGHT

2025' s 9x acceleration in buybacks (S$658.5m vs S$102m in 2024) coincides PRECISELY with:

Q3 provision announcement (Nov 6 selloff)
Asset management sale review (Dec 17)
Stock hitting S$34.00 support level

This is NOT panic buying. This is management saying: " At these prices, our shares represent exceptional value."

sfw2124 ( Date: 22-Dec-2025 22:03) Posted:

UOB (U11): Why Fund Managers Got It Wrong

The selling pressure on UOB reflects two management misunderstandings:

1️ ⃣ ASSET MANAGEMENT SALE &ne DISTRESS

The $28.8B USD asset sale is portfolio optimization, not financial desperation. UOB reallocates capital from lower-return asset management to higher-growth wholesale banking and wealth management. This signals disciplined capital allocation, not weakness.

2️ ⃣ $615M PROVISION &ne ASSET QUALITY DETERIORATION

The 72% Q3 profit decline is a one-off " kitchen sink" charge to front-load anticipated losses. NPL ratio stayed stable at 1.6%. Management confirmed final 2025 dividend UNAFFECTED&mdash clear confidence signal. This is balance-sheet strengthening.

THE NUMBERS DON' T LIE

Metric	UOB	OCBC	DBS
P/B	1.2x	1.4x	2.3x
P/E	9.9x	12.1x	14.0x
Dividend	6.5%	4.8%	5.2%

UOB = Cheapest valuation + Highest yield = Pure mispricing from headlines.

WHY FUND MANAGERS BAILED

✗ Headline trading (ignored non-recurring provisions)
✗ Momentum chasing (DBS/OCBC had better Q3 earnings)
✗ Risk-off bias (preferred " safe" DBS over recovery play)
✓ Your edge: Volume spike Dec 17 = capitulation selling exhausted

2026 RECOVERY INCOMING

✓ NIM stabilizes 1.75%-1.80%
✓ Credit costs normalize to 25-30 bps (vs 134 bps Q3)
✓ Fee income growing (cards + wealth management)
✓ Earnings rebound as provisions reverse

GEOPOLITICAL WIN

UOB = most ASEAN-centric bank. Trump 2.0 tariffs = manufacturing China &rarr Vietnam/Thailand/Malaysia = FDI financing + data center boom + trade finance growth. DBS/OCBC have Greater China headwinds instead.

ACTION

Value hunters &rarr Accumulate SGD 34-36, target SGD 40-42 (15-21% gain + 6.5% yield = 22-27% return, 12-18 months)

Sources: Bloomberg (Dec 17) Investment analysis files Singapore Banks 2026 Outlook DYODD

Joelton ( Date: 20-Dec-2025 14:00) Posted:

UOB is said to explore possible sale of asset management arm

United Overseas Bank (UOB) is exploring options for its asset management arm, including a possible sale, according to people familiar with the matter, as the Singaporean lender seeks to streamline. UOB is working with a financial adviser on a potential sale of UOB Asset Management, the people said, asking not to be identified because the deliberations are private. Other options include bringing in a partner to boost the unit&rsquo s growth, the people said.

A transaction may value UOB&rsquo s asset management business at several hundred million dollars, some of the people said.

Established in 1986, the UOB subsidiary had about $37.2 billion of assets under management at the end of the first quarter, its website shows. Based in Singapore and wholly owned by UOB, the asset manager also has a presence in Brunei, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Taiwan, Thailand and Vietnam.

UOB Asset Management may draw interest from other industry players as well as insurers and private equity firms, the people said. Considerations are preliminary and may not result in a transaction, they said. Declining to comment on the subject, a representative for UOB said the bank is focused on delivering long-term value to shareholders and meeting customer needs.

UOB last month set aside aprovision of $615 million, its biggest ever, citing commercial real estate risks in the US and Greater China. The bank&rsquo s shares have fallen about 4% this year, while the Straits Times Index has rallied 21%.

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UOB (U11): Why Fund Managers Got It Wrong

The selling pressure on UOB reflects two management misunderstandings:

1️ ⃣ ASSET MANAGEMENT SALE &ne DISTRESS

The $28.8B USD asset sale is portfolio optimization, not financial desperation. UOB reallocates capital from lower-return asset management to higher-growth wholesale banking and wealth management. This signals disciplined capital allocation, not weakness.

2️ ⃣ $615M PROVISION &ne ASSET QUALITY DETERIORATION

The 72% Q3 profit decline is a one-off " kitchen sink" charge to front-load anticipated losses. NPL ratio stayed stable at 1.6%. Management confirmed final 2025 dividend UNAFFECTED&mdash clear confidence signal. This is balance-sheet strengthening.

THE NUMBERS DON' T LIE

Metric	UOB	OCBC	DBS
P/B	1.2x	1.4x	2.3x
P/E	9.9x	12.1x	14.0x
Dividend	6.5%	4.8%	5.2%

UOB = Cheapest valuation + Highest yield = Pure mispricing from headlines.

WHY FUND MANAGERS BAILED

✗ Headline trading (ignored non-recurring provisions)
✗ Momentum chasing (DBS/OCBC had better Q3 earnings)
✗ Risk-off bias (preferred " safe" DBS over recovery play)
✓ Your edge: Volume spike Dec 17 = capitulation selling exhausted

2026 RECOVERY INCOMING

✓ NIM stabilizes 1.75%-1.80%
✓ Credit costs normalize to 25-30 bps (vs 134 bps Q3)
✓ Fee income growing (cards + wealth management)
✓ Earnings rebound as provisions reverse

GEOPOLITICAL WIN

UOB = most ASEAN-centric bank. Trump 2.0 tariffs = manufacturing China &rarr Vietnam/Thailand/Malaysia = FDI financing + data center boom + trade finance growth. DBS/OCBC have Greater China headwinds instead.

ACTION

Value hunters &rarr Accumulate SGD 34-36, target SGD 40-42 (15-21% gain + 6.5% yield = 22-27% return, 12-18 months)

Sources: Bloomberg (Dec 17) Investment analysis files Singapore Banks 2026 Outlook DYODD

Joelton ( Date: 20-Dec-2025 14:00) Posted:

UOB is said to explore possible sale of asset management arm

United Overseas Bank (UOB) is exploring options for its asset management arm, including a possible sale, according to people familiar with the matter, as the Singaporean lender seeks to streamline. UOB is working with a financial adviser on a potential sale of UOB Asset Management, the people said, asking not to be identified because the deliberations are private. Other options include bringing in a partner to boost the unit&rsquo s growth, the people said.

A transaction may value UOB&rsquo s asset management business at several hundred million dollars, some of the people said.

Established in 1986, the UOB subsidiary had about $37.2 billion of assets under management at the end of the first quarter, its website shows. Based in Singapore and wholly owned by UOB, the asset manager also has a presence in Brunei, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Taiwan, Thailand and Vietnam.

UOB Asset Management may draw interest from other industry players as well as insurers and private equity firms, the people said. Considerations are preliminary and may not result in a transaction, they said. Declining to comment on the subject, a representative for UOB said the bank is focused on delivering long-term value to shareholders and meeting customer needs.

UOB last month set aside aprovision of $615 million, its biggest ever, citing commercial real estate risks in the US and Greater China. The bank&rsquo s shares have fallen about 4% this year, while the Straits Times Index has rallied 21%.

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Yangzijiang Shipbuilding YZJ Classification 6 The JPM Call: Least Preferred/Underweight. Cites " peak cycle," valuation concerns, and US tariff risks. Why Perplexity AI Disagree: Order Book Visibility: JPMʼ s view ignores the sheer duration of YZJʼ s order book, which extends into 2027/2028. Recent wins US$4.5B target) and high-margin dual fuel vessels protect earnings visibility far better than in previous cycles. 8 > Valuation Mismatch: Trading at 7.6x PE despite record profits is not " expensive" by historical or global standards. US Risk Overblown? While US investigation risks exist, YZJʼ s client base is global Europe/Asia). A blanket bearishness ignores their ability to pivot to non-US orders. The " peak cycle" argument has been wrong for 18 months the cycle is arguably " higher for longer" due to green transition regulations

AhTan888 ( Date: 19-Dec-2025 17:35) Posted:

Agree with you the price is heavily manipulated. I always read this type of analyst report with a pinch of salt. JPM just say it's their least preferred without reasons so they can short it down and collect, next week they will say because of some updates or whatever reason, they upgrade YZJ.

JAMMIE ( Date: 19-Dec-2025 13:32) Posted:

The price is being manipulated and shorted down for no reason. Topday there is an aticle by JPM and they said that YZJ is not their preferred pick for 2026, WHY, becuase they sold al ltheir holding in YZJ recently, and they are probably short on the stock now. Height of manipulation.

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So can you say categorically Hong Fok(H30) share buy back mandate has good rather than ill-intentions?

No&mdash You Cannot Say Categorically That Hong Fok' s Buyback Mandate Has Good Intentions

The short answer is no, and here' s why the governance structure and ownership dynamics are concerning, despite lower financial risk than Paincare.

The Core Problem: Governance Mirrors Paincare' s Weakness

In April 2025, Hong Fok' s Chairman Adrian Chan Pengee was re-designated from an independent director to a non-independent chairman due to tenure-based rules under the SGX Listing Manual. This is a significant governance red flag because the Code of Corporate Governance Provision 3.1 requires board independence, especially when the chairman wields operational influence. Hong Fok' s board responded by appointing a Lead Independent Director (Kwik Sam Aik) after the fact&mdash a reactive safeguard, not a proactive one.

More critically, the company has a related-party control structure that directly incentivises selective capital deployment. Sim Eng Cheong holds 14% of Hong Fok' s shares and simultaneously serves as Co-Chief Executive Officer. Pin Chuan Cheong, the other CEO, holds 2.8% directly. This mirrors exactly the conflict-of-interest problem that plagued Paincare: management that has both operational control and significant ownership stakes stands to benefit when the company deploys capital in ways that concentrate minority shareholders' losses.

The Ill-Intention Incentive: How Buybacks Benefit Related Parties

When a company conducts aggressive buybacks&mdash and Hong Fok has purchased 4,289,400 shares (0.524% of issued capital) in just 3.5 weeks starting November 19, 2025&mdash the effect is to reduce the total float while insiders' ownership percentages increase without them spending additional capital.

If Sim Eng Cheong holds 14% before a buyback of 5 million shares, his 14% represents a larger slice of a smaller pie after the buyback. This is a wealth transfer mechanism from minority shareholders to the controlling shareholder, particularly if the buyback occurs at prices below intrinsic value. There is no evidence that Hong Fok management has disclosed that buybacks only occur at prices verified to be below intrinsic value&mdash a protection Paincare also lacked.

Why the Risk Is Lower Than Paincare (But Still Present)

Hong Fok does not exhibit the critical failure points that collapsed Paincare' s privatisation scheme:

1. No Goodwill Risk: Hong Fok' s goodwill is only S$276,000 against S$3.7 billion in total assets&mdash essentially negligible (0.007%). Paincare' s vulnerabilities stemmed from goodwill-heavy healthcare acquisitions that deteriorated. Hong Fok' s recent acquisitions have been property-focused (February 2025 property acquisition completion announced), not acquisition-integration dependent.

2. Strong Financial Backing: Hong Fok has S$2.9 billion in shareholder equity and S$659 million in long-term debt, with stable property rental income generating S$38 million+ in annual revenue. Paincare failed because it became dependent on external credit facilities (UOB) that lapsed. Hong Fok' s equity cushion and tangible asset base provide protection.

3. Profitable Operations: The company is generating dividends (S$0.01 final dividend proposed) and profitability independent of share-price gymnastics. Paincare' s operations had deteriorated by the time the privatisation was proposed.

What You Cannot Assume

You cannot categorically say the buyback has " good intentions" because:

Governance weakness is structural, not accidental. The loss of an independent chairman combined with related-party CEO control creates precisely the conditions under which minority oppression occurs.
The buyback pace is aggressive&mdash 0.15% per week since November 19 suggests operational urgency rather than measured, shareholder-value-accretion discipline.
No public disclosure exists explaining why buybacks are being executed now, at what price validation they occur, or what threshold of intrinsic value has been established. Paincare' s governance failures began here&mdash with vague communication and lack of independent scrutiny.

Red Flags to Monitor for H30

If you are a minority shareholder in Hong Fok, watch for:

Acceleration of buybacks beyond 0.2% per week, which would signal aggressive minority suppression
Any deterioration in property rental yields or distressed property sales, which would weaken the financial cushion and create vulnerability to external funding pressure
Dividend cuts or suspension, which would reveal that profitability has declined (obscured during buyback activity)
Sim Eng Cheong' s ownership percentage increasing through the buyback process without him contributing capital&mdash evidence of value transfer
Rubber-stamp board approvals with no independent dissent on buyback decisions, signaling the Lead Independent Director safeguard is ineffective

Conclusion

Hong Fok' s buyback mandate cannot be given a clean bill of health as having " good intentions" due to the governance structure. However, it is not currently in the acute distress zone that Paincare entered. The financial backing is stronger, the asset quality is higher, and goodwill risk is negligible. Monitor governance decisions closely rather than assuming benign intent if the board lacks the independence to challenge management buyback proposals, you have evidence of ill-intentions unfolding. DYODD

7ocean ( Date: 19-Dec-2025 12:15) Posted:

NO $1.50 No Sell

TikTalk ( Date: 19-Dec-2025 11:09) Posted:

Continued to buy back share on 17 & 18 Decembe

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Current Price: 4.53 SGD | Bias: Bullish (Accumulation Phase) | Target: 5.71 SGD (DBS)

Technical Setup &mdash All Signals Bullish

Aroon Crossover: Downtrend exhausted uptrend initiating | MACD: Bullish crossover above signal line | RSI: Neutral at 50.94 (room to run higher) | Support: 4.48-4.50 (critical demand zone established with long wicks)

Trading Strategies for Tomorrow

Strategy	Entry	Stop Loss	Targets	Best For
Day Trader	4.54-4.55	Below 4.52	4.60 / 4.64	Intraday pullbacks
Swing Trader	4.55-4.60 current / 4.50 on dip	Close below 4.45	4.80 / 5.00 / 5.71	3-6 month hold
Scalper	Long break of 4.57 on volume	N/A	4.60 (2-3 ticks)	Range trades

Key Catalysts & Risks

Negative: Optus outage review shows 75% emergency call failure rate IMDA fine SGD 1M Australian regulatory scrutiny ongoing.

Positive: Optus EBIT +27% | Revenue +2% | STT GDC mega-deal (> S$5B) potentially closing by year-end | Dividends from associates up to S$1.1B. DYODD

MrBear12 ( Date: 17-Dec-2025 08:23) Posted:

Fat hope That will require a Fat 🐻

TA_Expert ( Date: 17-Dec-2025 01:05) Posted:

Hurray! Singtel, down, down more...... best is under $4..... Many new investors will love to enter under $4.

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Strategic Guidance for Hong Fok (H30) Shareholders per Perplexity AI(DYODD)

Current Market Context

Stock Price & Valuation:
Hong Fok trades at approximately SGD $0.84 (as of December 2025), with a market capitalization of around SGD $658 million. This represents a significant 71% discount to the company' s NTA per share of SGD $2.9515 from the FY2024 balance sheet.

Dividend Yield:
The company pays a modest annual dividend of SGD $0.01 per share (1.20% yield), maintained consistently for the past several years. No interim dividend is declared only a final dividend at year-end.

Financial Performance Assessment (H1 2025)

Mixed Results:

Revenue: SGD $46.9 million (+5% YoY)
Profit attributable to owners: SGD $5.4 million (+49% YoY)
NAV per share: 358 cents (group basis, down from 361 cents at FY2024)
Earnings per share: 0.85 cents (up from 0.57 cents YoY)

Key Concerns:

NAV per share declined slightly due to Hong Kong dollar translation losses (SGD $36 million) on overseas properties, despite strong operating profit.
Hotel operations (YOTEL Singapore) facing headwinds from currency movements and market conditions.
Exchange rate volatility is a significant headwind for this Hong Kong-listed property portfolio.

Recommended Actions for Shareholders

1. HOLD &ndash If You' re Long-Term Value Investors

This is the most prudent position for three compelling reasons:

Massive Discount to Intrinsic Value: At SGD $0.84 per share against NTA of SGD $2.9515, you' re buying assets at a 71% discount. This represents extraordinary margin of safety. The buyback program confirms management recognizes this valuation anomaly.

Accretive Buyback Program: The authorization to repurchase up to 81.93 million shares (10% of issued capital) at prices around SGD $0.81&ndash 0.93 will systematically increase NTA per share by 8&ndash 9% upon full execution. Even at the current slow pace (5.24% deployed), this creates tangible per-share value accretion without dilution.

Solid Asset Base: The Group holds SGD $3.65 billion in assets, primarily high-quality investment properties in Singapore and Hong Kong generating stable rental income. This underlying asset quality anchors the valuation floor.

2. COLLECT THE DIVIDEND &ndash But Keep Expectations Modest

Annual dividend of SGD $0.01 per share provides minimal yield (1.2%)
However, at SGD $0.84 per share trading, this may be supplemented by capital appreciation as the market recognizes the discount
The company maintains a conservative 25% payout ratio, retaining capital for growth and buybacks

3. MONITOR THE BUYBACK EXECUTION &ndash Watch for Acceleration

Current progress is painfully slow (only 4.29 million of 81.93 million shares bought in 8 months)
Red Flag: This could indicate the share price has held above buyback targets, suggesting market is repricing higher
Positive Sign: Any acceleration would be accretive to remaining shareholders
Request management commentary on buyback pace and pricing targets at next investor call

4. TRACK CURRENCY HEADWINDS &ndash Hong Kong Properties Are a Drag

The company' s Hong Kong dollar-denominated assets created a SGD $36 million translation loss in H1 2025
If SGD strengthens further, this will continue to suppress reported NAV per share and earnings
Conversely, SGD weakness could provide upside surprise
Monitor the company' s currency hedging strategy in investor disclosures

5. ASSESS HOTEL SEGMENT RECOVERY &ndash Key Catalyst

YOTEL Singapore remains challenged but is a potential catalyst
Management indicates operational improvements expected in H2 2025
If YOTEL stabilizes, rental income should lift meaningfully
This segment' s performance is critical to full year 2025 earnings

Key Risk Factors to Watch

Risk	Severity	Mitigation
Persistent Discount Valuation	Medium	Buyback program gradually reduces share count long-term market education needed
Currency Volatility (HK$)	High	Monitor SGD/HKD rates company may increase hedging
Hotel Operations Weakness	Medium	Management improvement initiatives diversified portfolio reduces concentration risk
Rising Interest Rates	Medium	Current rate environment stable refinancing risk on new borrowings
Low Dividend Yield	Low	Offset by capital appreciation potential from discount narrowing

Valuation Comparison Framework

Metric	Current	Fair Value	Upside Potential
Share Price	SGD $0.84	SGD $2.40&ndash 2.95	+185&ndash 251%
NTA Per Share	SGD $2.9515	Baseline	&mdash
P/NTA Multiple	0.28x	0.80&ndash 1.0x	Reasonable normalization

At 0.28x NTA, Hong Fok trades below most listed property trusts and real estate companies. Normalization to 0.80&ndash 1.0x NTA would imply share prices of SGD $2.40&ndash $2.95.

Bottom-Line Recommendation for Shareholders

ACCUMULATE SELECTIVELY on any weakness below SGD $0.80. The combination of:

Massive NAV discount (71%)
Accretive buyback program
Stable property portfolio generating cash
Management recognition of valuation gap

...creates a compelling risk-reward for patient, value-oriented investors. The key is maintaining a multi-year investment horizon and not expecting rapid share price appreciation. The buyback program and currency stabilization will be the two most important catalysts to monitor.

Avoid if you need:

Regular income (only 1.2% dividend)
Quick capital appreciation
Predictable earnings (currency volatility is significant)

For long-term wealth preservation and value accumulation, Hong Fok represents a sleeping giant in Singapore' s property sector.

sfw2124 ( Date: 16-Dec-2025 05:09) Posted:

Hong Fok (H30) - NTA Per Share Analysis After Share Buyback

Based on Hong Fok' s FY2024 financial statements and the share buyback mandate approved on 30 April 2025, here is the comprehensive NTA analysis:

Current Position (as at 31 December 2024)

Outstanding Shares: 767,982,140 shares (819.3 million issued minus 51.3 million treasury shares)

Equity & NTA:

Total equity attributable to owners: SGD $2,316.1 million
Goodwill and intangibles: SGD $49.4 million
Net Tangible Assets (NTA): SGD $2,266.7 million
Current NTA per share: SGD $2.9515

Share Buyback Mandate Details

Hong Fok received approval to buy back up to 81.93 million shares (10% of issued capital) at the AGM on 30 April 2025. However, progress has been remarkably slow:

Shares already purchased: 4.29 million (only 5.24% of the mandate)
Remaining authorization: 77.64 million shares (94.76% of mandate)

NTA Per Share Projections After Full Buyback

Scenario A: Full Buyback at S$0.81 per share (5% above 5-day average price)

Total buyback cost: SGD $66.4 million
Resulting NTA per share: SGD $3.2072
Accretion: +8.66% (SGD $0.2557 per share)

Scenario B: Full Buyback at S$0.93 per share (20% above 5-day average price)

Total buyback cost: SGD $76.2 million
Resulting NTA per share: SGD $3.1929
Accretion: +8.18% (SGD $0.2414 per share)

Scenario C: Current Progress (4.29M shares at estimated S$0.87 average)

Cost incurred: SGD $3.7 million
Resulting NTA per share: SGD $2.9632
Accretion: +0.40% (SGD $0.0117 per share)

Why This Buyback Is Highly Accretive

The buyback prices (S$0.81&ndash 0.93) represent a massive 68&ndash 73% discount to the current NTA per share of S$2.9515. This enormous discount means:

Every share retired at S$0.81 removes only S$0.81 of equity while eliminating an ownership claim worth S$2.9515 of assets per share
The reduction in share count outweighs the reduction in total equity, automatically increasing NTA per share
This is the mathematical principle of accretive buybacks: when purchase price < NTA per share, remaining shareholders benefit

Critical Observation: Extremely Slow Execution

The most striking aspect of this mandate is the snail' s pace of execution. After 8+ months (April to December 2025), only 5.24% of the authorized buyback has been completed. This suggests:

The share price has likely remained firm above the maximum buyback prices (S$0.81&ndash 0.93)
Minimal traded volume at these price levels
Management' s cautious approach to deploying capital
Possible expectations of better entry prices in the future

Key Takeaway

At full execution, Hong Fok' s NTA per share would increase from SGD $2.9515 to approximately SGD $3.20, representing 8.66% accretion. This is an exceptionally attractive shareholder value creation mechanism, particularly given the vast discount between buyback prices and intrinsic asset value. However, the slow pace of deployment suggests the company may be waiting for market conditions to become more favorable for the buyback program.

sfw2124 ( Date: 13-Dec-2025 14:35) Posted:

Top 12 Major Shareholders and Entities

Tier 1: Largest Individual/Institutional Shareholders

1. Public Shareholders &ndash 252,507,379 shares (30.82%)

Collectively, retail and institutional investors (no single public shareholder exceeding 2% individually) hold nearly one-third of Hong Fok. This provides meaningful minority shareholder protection and ensures the company meets SGX listing public float requirements.

2. Hong Fok Land International Ltd. &ndash 177,589,632 shares (21.68%)

The single largest shareholder, this private holding company is controlled by the Cheong family and serves as the principal investment vehicle. Notably, Hong Fok Land International is separately listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, creating interesting family office dynamics with cross-holdings. This entity represents the family' s long-term strategic commitment to Hong Fok.

3. Pin Chuan Cheong (CEO) &ndash 117,058,912 shares (14.29%)

As Chief Executive Officer, Pin Chuan Cheong holds direct voting control of 14.29% of shares. However, his actual effective voting power reaches approximately 17-18% when deemed interests are included&mdash holdings through P.C. Cheong Pte Ltd (99% owned by him), Corporate Development Limited, and family structures are counted. This makes him the most influential individual shareholder from an operational standpoint.

4. Sim Eng Cheong (Co-CEO) &ndash 114,511,756 shares (13.98%)

As Executive Director and Co-Chief Executive Officer managing Singapore operations, Sim Eng Cheong holds the second-largest direct shareholding. Importantly, his effective total voting power reaches approximately 20.41% when deemed interests (held by his wife, Corporate Development Limited, and Goodyear Realty Co. Pte Ltd) are included. Research indicates he has been an active trader, having sold 632,500 shares in December 2024, yet continues to hold substantial stakes&mdash suggesting confidence in long-term value.

Tier 2: Corporate and Family Entity Holdings

5. Hong Fok Corporation Ltd. (Treasury) &ndash 51,315,000 shares (6.26%)

These are treasury shares&mdash repurchased shares held by the company itself and not voting. As of the April 2025 shareholder resolution, treasury holdings stood at 51.3 million shares. With the ongoing buyback program (approximately 4 million shares repurchased since April 2025), this treasury balance continues to grow. Treasury shares serve multiple purposes: employee share scheme issuances, acquisition currency, or permanent cancellation to reduce share count and enhance NTA per share.

6. Goodyear Realty Co. Pte Ltd. &ndash 44,485,758 shares (5.43%)

This Cheong family-controlled property investment vehicle holds 5.43% of Hong Fok. The shareholding is deemed to be held by Sim Eng Cheong and Pin Chuan Cheong through family structures, effectively consolidating family control. It represents one component of the broader Cheong family real estate portfolio.

Tier 3: Other Named Shareholders and Family Members

7. Cheng Tuan Donald Teo &ndash 18,244,500 shares (2.23%)

An external board-related investor holding 2.23% of shares appears in official substantial shareholder registers.

8. Hooi Kheng Cheong &ndash 14,832,180 shares (1.81%)

An extended family member maintaining a consistent 1.81% shareholding.

9. Lay Kheng Cheong &ndash 14,233,000 shares (1.74%)

Another family member with 1.74% ownership, part of the broader Cheong family holding pattern.

10. Cheong Aik Yen Roy &ndash 13,400,000 shares (1.64%)

Family member with 1.64% direct interest.

11. Morph Investments Ltd. &ndash 10,610,000 shares (1.30%)

A private investment company holding 1.30% of shares appears to be an institutional investor.

12. Poh Koon Khoo &ndash 9,014,391 shares (1.10%)

An individual investor (not family-related) with 1.10% shareholding.

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Hong Fok (H30) - NTA Per Share Analysis After Share Buyback

Based on Hong Fok' s FY2024 financial statements and the share buyback mandate approved on 30 April 2025, here is the comprehensive NTA analysis:

Current Position (as at 31 December 2024)

Outstanding Shares: 767,982,140 shares (819.3 million issued minus 51.3 million treasury shares)

Equity & NTA:

Total equity attributable to owners: SGD $2,316.1 million
Goodwill and intangibles: SGD $49.4 million
Net Tangible Assets (NTA): SGD $2,266.7 million
Current NTA per share: SGD $2.9515

Share Buyback Mandate Details

Hong Fok received approval to buy back up to 81.93 million shares (10% of issued capital) at the AGM on 30 April 2025. However, progress has been remarkably slow:

Shares already purchased: 4.29 million (only 5.24% of the mandate)
Remaining authorization: 77.64 million shares (94.76% of mandate)

NTA Per Share Projections After Full Buyback

Scenario A: Full Buyback at S$0.81 per share (5% above 5-day average price)

Total buyback cost: SGD $66.4 million
Resulting NTA per share: SGD $3.2072
Accretion: +8.66% (SGD $0.2557 per share)

Scenario B: Full Buyback at S$0.93 per share (20% above 5-day average price)

Total buyback cost: SGD $76.2 million
Resulting NTA per share: SGD $3.1929
Accretion: +8.18% (SGD $0.2414 per share)

Scenario C: Current Progress (4.29M shares at estimated S$0.87 average)

Cost incurred: SGD $3.7 million
Resulting NTA per share: SGD $2.9632
Accretion: +0.40% (SGD $0.0117 per share)

Why This Buyback Is Highly Accretive

The buyback prices (S$0.81&ndash 0.93) represent a massive 68&ndash 73% discount to the current NTA per share of S$2.9515. This enormous discount means:

Every share retired at S$0.81 removes only S$0.81 of equity while eliminating an ownership claim worth S$2.9515 of assets per share
The reduction in share count outweighs the reduction in total equity, automatically increasing NTA per share
This is the mathematical principle of accretive buybacks: when purchase price < NTA per share, remaining shareholders benefit

Critical Observation: Extremely Slow Execution

The most striking aspect of this mandate is the snail' s pace of execution. After 8+ months (April to December 2025), only 5.24% of the authorized buyback has been completed. This suggests:

The share price has likely remained firm above the maximum buyback prices (S$0.81&ndash 0.93)
Minimal traded volume at these price levels
Management' s cautious approach to deploying capital
Possible expectations of better entry prices in the future

Key Takeaway

At full execution, Hong Fok' s NTA per share would increase from SGD $2.9515 to approximately SGD $3.20, representing 8.66% accretion. This is an exceptionally attractive shareholder value creation mechanism, particularly given the vast discount between buyback prices and intrinsic asset value. However, the slow pace of deployment suggests the company may be waiting for market conditions to become more favorable for the buyback program.

sfw2124 ( Date: 13-Dec-2025 14:35) Posted:

Top 12 Major Shareholders and Entities

Tier 1: Largest Individual/Institutional Shareholders

1. Public Shareholders &ndash 252,507,379 shares (30.82%)

Collectively, retail and institutional investors (no single public shareholder exceeding 2% individually) hold nearly one-third of Hong Fok. This provides meaningful minority shareholder protection and ensures the company meets SGX listing public float requirements.

2. Hong Fok Land International Ltd. &ndash 177,589,632 shares (21.68%)

The single largest shareholder, this private holding company is controlled by the Cheong family and serves as the principal investment vehicle. Notably, Hong Fok Land International is separately listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, creating interesting family office dynamics with cross-holdings. This entity represents the family' s long-term strategic commitment to Hong Fok.

3. Pin Chuan Cheong (CEO) &ndash 117,058,912 shares (14.29%)

As Chief Executive Officer, Pin Chuan Cheong holds direct voting control of 14.29% of shares. However, his actual effective voting power reaches approximately 17-18% when deemed interests are included&mdash holdings through P.C. Cheong Pte Ltd (99% owned by him), Corporate Development Limited, and family structures are counted. This makes him the most influential individual shareholder from an operational standpoint.

4. Sim Eng Cheong (Co-CEO) &ndash 114,511,756 shares (13.98%)

As Executive Director and Co-Chief Executive Officer managing Singapore operations, Sim Eng Cheong holds the second-largest direct shareholding. Importantly, his effective total voting power reaches approximately 20.41% when deemed interests (held by his wife, Corporate Development Limited, and Goodyear Realty Co. Pte Ltd) are included. Research indicates he has been an active trader, having sold 632,500 shares in December 2024, yet continues to hold substantial stakes&mdash suggesting confidence in long-term value.

Tier 2: Corporate and Family Entity Holdings

5. Hong Fok Corporation Ltd. (Treasury) &ndash 51,315,000 shares (6.26%)

These are treasury shares&mdash repurchased shares held by the company itself and not voting. As of the April 2025 shareholder resolution, treasury holdings stood at 51.3 million shares. With the ongoing buyback program (approximately 4 million shares repurchased since April 2025), this treasury balance continues to grow. Treasury shares serve multiple purposes: employee share scheme issuances, acquisition currency, or permanent cancellation to reduce share count and enhance NTA per share.

6. Goodyear Realty Co. Pte Ltd. &ndash 44,485,758 shares (5.43%)

This Cheong family-controlled property investment vehicle holds 5.43% of Hong Fok. The shareholding is deemed to be held by Sim Eng Cheong and Pin Chuan Cheong through family structures, effectively consolidating family control. It represents one component of the broader Cheong family real estate portfolio.

Tier 3: Other Named Shareholders and Family Members

7. Cheng Tuan Donald Teo &ndash 18,244,500 shares (2.23%)

An external board-related investor holding 2.23% of shares appears in official substantial shareholder registers.

8. Hooi Kheng Cheong &ndash 14,832,180 shares (1.81%)

An extended family member maintaining a consistent 1.81% shareholding.

9. Lay Kheng Cheong &ndash 14,233,000 shares (1.74%)

Another family member with 1.74% ownership, part of the broader Cheong family holding pattern.

10. Cheong Aik Yen Roy &ndash 13,400,000 shares (1.64%)

Family member with 1.64% direct interest.

11. Morph Investments Ltd. &ndash 10,610,000 shares (1.30%)

A private investment company holding 1.30% of shares appears to be an institutional investor.

12. Poh Koon Khoo &ndash 9,014,391 shares (1.10%)

An individual investor (not family-related) with 1.10% shareholding.

sfw2124 ( Date: 13-Dec-2025 14:05) Posted:

Hong Fok Share Buyback: Updated Figures as of 12 December 2025

Cumulative Buyback Status

As of 12 December 2025, Hong Fok has purchased approximately 4.0 million shares under its 81,929,714-share mandate, representing 0.488% of issued shares and 4.88% of total authorized repurchase capacity. This represents a significant acceleration from the 2,673,400 shares (0.326%) reported on 2 December 2025.

Key Update Details

Execution Timeline:

Mandate Start: 30 April 2025
Cumulative Period: 6.5 months (April through mid-December)
Remaining Authorization: Approximately 77,929,714 shares (95.12% unused)

Notable Acceleration in December:
The buyback has dramatically accelerated in December 2025. From April through November, approximately 2.7 million shares were purchased (~540,000 per month). In the first 12 trading days of December alone, approximately 1.3 million shares were repurchased (~108,000 per day)&mdash representing a four-fold increase in daily pace.

Strategic Significance of December Acceleration

This substantial pickup in buying activity suggests three important implications:

1. Valuation Opportunity Window

The recent surge indicates management views current share prices (~S$0.84 as of 12 December) as particularly attractive. The stock gained 4.35% in the past 5 days and 2.44% year-to-date, yet board continues aggressive repurchasing, signaling conviction that value still exists despite price appreciation.

2. Year-End Cash Deployment

December acceleration reflects opportunistic use of year-end operating cash flows and liquidity. Rather than accumulate cash, the board is deploying capital efficiently through repurchases before valuation multiples potentially adjust upward.

3. EPS Accretion Targeting

Accelerated year-end repurchases maximize the benefit to full-year 2025 earnings per share calculations. Each million shares retired reduces the share base denominator, immediately accretive to EPS for the full year.

Updated Financial Impact

If Hong Fok continues its current December pace through year-end, reaching approximately 6 million cumulative shares repurchased:

Metric	Before Buyback	After 6M Shares	Impact
Share Count	819.3M	813.3M	-0.73%
Treasury Shares Held	51.3M	57.3M	+6M
NTA Per Share	S$3.61	S$3.64	+0.8%
EPS Accretion	Baseline	+0.8-1.0%	Modest positive
Issued Shares (Ex-Treasury)	768M	762M	-6M

Even the partial 6 million-share repurchase creates measurable shareholder value through NTA accretion and mechanical EPS improvement.

Strategic Interpretation

Phase 1 (April-November): Measured, opportunistic purchasing at deeply discounted valuations (P/B 0.21x share prices S$0.77-S$0.78)

Phase 2 (December onwards): Tactical acceleration as new opportunities emerge and year-end liquidity becomes available

Phase 3 (2026 onwards): Significant authorization remains (77M+ shares still available) if valuations remain favorable

Key Safeguards Maintained

Despite accelerated buying, Hong Fok maintains robust governance controls:

Public Float: Remains above 30% (well above 10% minimum requirement)
No Takeover Obligation: Directors' voting rights unaffected no mandatory offer triggered
Balance Sheet: Gearing remains conservative at ~0.23x unaffected by buyback pace
Liquidity: Operating cash flow of S$50M+ annually supports repurchases without debt increase

Conclusion

Hong Fok' s 4 million cumulative share repurchase as of 12 December 2025 demonstrates disciplined yet decisive capital allocation. The December acceleration signals management conviction in shareholder value while maintaining operational flexibility. With 95.12% of the mandate still available, the board retains substantial dry powder for opportunistic future repurchases, reflecting a balance between tactical aggression and strategic patience in deploying shareholder capital.

x 0

NEWS RELEASE CSE Global Secures Major Electrification Contracts Worth S$161.7 million Singapore, 15 December 2025 &ndash CSE Global Limited (&ldquo CSE Global&rdquo or the &ldquo Group&rdquo ), a global systems integrator providing electrification, communications and automation solutions, today announced that it has secured three major contracts worth US$124.6 million (approximately S$161.7 million) in the United States of America (&ldquo USA&rdquo ). These contracts are for the design and manufacturing of power distribution centres, as well as the integration of complex electrical and control systems and equipment in the USA for the Liquefied Natural Gas (&ldquo LNG&rdquo ) market. The contracts are slated for execution between 2026 and 2028.

sfw2124 ( Date: 11-Dec-2025 20:59) Posted:

https://www.nextinsight.net/story-archive-mainmenu-60/948-2025/16457-from-oil-to-ai-how-a-2019-acquisition-sparked-cse-globals-amazon-journey

kepoh88 ( Date: 11-Dec-2025 15:57) Posted:

if can get USD1.5 billion contract over 5 years or US$300M per year is mucgh much better than
current US$50-100M annual revenue is not bad.

x 0

Top 12 Major Shareholders and Entities

Tier 1: Largest Individual/Institutional Shareholders

1. Public Shareholders &ndash 252,507,379 shares (30.82%)

Collectively, retail and institutional investors (no single public shareholder exceeding 2% individually) hold nearly one-third of Hong Fok. This provides meaningful minority shareholder protection and ensures the company meets SGX listing public float requirements.

2. Hong Fok Land International Ltd. &ndash 177,589,632 shares (21.68%)

The single largest shareholder, this private holding company is controlled by the Cheong family and serves as the principal investment vehicle. Notably, Hong Fok Land International is separately listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, creating interesting family office dynamics with cross-holdings. This entity represents the family' s long-term strategic commitment to Hong Fok.

3. Pin Chuan Cheong (CEO) &ndash 117,058,912 shares (14.29%)

As Chief Executive Officer, Pin Chuan Cheong holds direct voting control of 14.29% of shares. However, his actual effective voting power reaches approximately 17-18% when deemed interests are included&mdash holdings through P.C. Cheong Pte Ltd (99% owned by him), Corporate Development Limited, and family structures are counted. This makes him the most influential individual shareholder from an operational standpoint.

4. Sim Eng Cheong (Co-CEO) &ndash 114,511,756 shares (13.98%)

As Executive Director and Co-Chief Executive Officer managing Singapore operations, Sim Eng Cheong holds the second-largest direct shareholding. Importantly, his effective total voting power reaches approximately 20.41% when deemed interests (held by his wife, Corporate Development Limited, and Goodyear Realty Co. Pte Ltd) are included. Research indicates he has been an active trader, having sold 632,500 shares in December 2024, yet continues to hold substantial stakes&mdash suggesting confidence in long-term value.

Tier 2: Corporate and Family Entity Holdings

5. Hong Fok Corporation Ltd. (Treasury) &ndash 51,315,000 shares (6.26%)

These are treasury shares&mdash repurchased shares held by the company itself and not voting. As of the April 2025 shareholder resolution, treasury holdings stood at 51.3 million shares. With the ongoing buyback program (approximately 4 million shares repurchased since April 2025), this treasury balance continues to grow. Treasury shares serve multiple purposes: employee share scheme issuances, acquisition currency, or permanent cancellation to reduce share count and enhance NTA per share.

6. Goodyear Realty Co. Pte Ltd. &ndash 44,485,758 shares (5.43%)

This Cheong family-controlled property investment vehicle holds 5.43% of Hong Fok. The shareholding is deemed to be held by Sim Eng Cheong and Pin Chuan Cheong through family structures, effectively consolidating family control. It represents one component of the broader Cheong family real estate portfolio.

Tier 3: Other Named Shareholders and Family Members

7. Cheng Tuan Donald Teo &ndash 18,244,500 shares (2.23%)

An external board-related investor holding 2.23% of shares appears in official substantial shareholder registers.

8. Hooi Kheng Cheong &ndash 14,832,180 shares (1.81%)

An extended family member maintaining a consistent 1.81% shareholding.

9. Lay Kheng Cheong &ndash 14,233,000 shares (1.74%)

Another family member with 1.74% ownership, part of the broader Cheong family holding pattern.

10. Cheong Aik Yen Roy &ndash 13,400,000 shares (1.64%)

Family member with 1.64% direct interest.

11. Morph Investments Ltd. &ndash 10,610,000 shares (1.30%)

A private investment company holding 1.30% of shares appears to be an institutional investor.

12. Poh Koon Khoo &ndash 9,014,391 shares (1.10%)

An individual investor (not family-related) with 1.10% shareholding.

sfw2124 ( Date: 13-Dec-2025 14:05) Posted:

Hong Fok Share Buyback: Updated Figures as of 12 December 2025

Cumulative Buyback Status

As of 12 December 2025, Hong Fok has purchased approximately 4.0 million shares under its 81,929,714-share mandate, representing 0.488% of issued shares and 4.88% of total authorized repurchase capacity. This represents a significant acceleration from the 2,673,400 shares (0.326%) reported on 2 December 2025.

Key Update Details

Execution Timeline:

Mandate Start: 30 April 2025
Cumulative Period: 6.5 months (April through mid-December)
Remaining Authorization: Approximately 77,929,714 shares (95.12% unused)

Notable Acceleration in December:
The buyback has dramatically accelerated in December 2025. From April through November, approximately 2.7 million shares were purchased (~540,000 per month). In the first 12 trading days of December alone, approximately 1.3 million shares were repurchased (~108,000 per day)&mdash representing a four-fold increase in daily pace.

Strategic Significance of December Acceleration

This substantial pickup in buying activity suggests three important implications:

1. Valuation Opportunity Window

The recent surge indicates management views current share prices (~S$0.84 as of 12 December) as particularly attractive. The stock gained 4.35% in the past 5 days and 2.44% year-to-date, yet board continues aggressive repurchasing, signaling conviction that value still exists despite price appreciation.

2. Year-End Cash Deployment

December acceleration reflects opportunistic use of year-end operating cash flows and liquidity. Rather than accumulate cash, the board is deploying capital efficiently through repurchases before valuation multiples potentially adjust upward.

3. EPS Accretion Targeting

Accelerated year-end repurchases maximize the benefit to full-year 2025 earnings per share calculations. Each million shares retired reduces the share base denominator, immediately accretive to EPS for the full year.

Updated Financial Impact

If Hong Fok continues its current December pace through year-end, reaching approximately 6 million cumulative shares repurchased:

Metric	Before Buyback	After 6M Shares	Impact
Share Count	819.3M	813.3M	-0.73%
Treasury Shares Held	51.3M	57.3M	+6M
NTA Per Share	S$3.61	S$3.64	+0.8%
EPS Accretion	Baseline	+0.8-1.0%	Modest positive
Issued Shares (Ex-Treasury)	768M	762M	-6M

Even the partial 6 million-share repurchase creates measurable shareholder value through NTA accretion and mechanical EPS improvement.

Strategic Interpretation

Phase 1 (April-November): Measured, opportunistic purchasing at deeply discounted valuations (P/B 0.21x share prices S$0.77-S$0.78)

Phase 2 (December onwards): Tactical acceleration as new opportunities emerge and year-end liquidity becomes available

Phase 3 (2026 onwards): Significant authorization remains (77M+ shares still available) if valuations remain favorable

Key Safeguards Maintained

Despite accelerated buying, Hong Fok maintains robust governance controls:

Public Float: Remains above 30% (well above 10% minimum requirement)
No Takeover Obligation: Directors' voting rights unaffected no mandatory offer triggered
Balance Sheet: Gearing remains conservative at ~0.23x unaffected by buyback pace
Liquidity: Operating cash flow of S$50M+ annually supports repurchases without debt increase

Conclusion

Hong Fok' s 4 million cumulative share repurchase as of 12 December 2025 demonstrates disciplined yet decisive capital allocation. The December acceleration signals management conviction in shareholder value while maintaining operational flexibility. With 95.12% of the mandate still available, the board retains substantial dry powder for opportunistic future repurchases, reflecting a balance between tactical aggression and strategic patience in deploying shareholder capital.

sfw2124 ( Date: 10-Dec-2025 23:02) Posted:

Real Shareholder Value Creation

Scenario: Sell International Building (S$510M) + Concourse (S$1,000M) = S$1,510M proceeds
- Value per share created: S$1.84+ immediately (from S$1,510M ÷ 820M shares)